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In December 2025, while monitoring electricity procurement in the Kherson region, we drew attention to a recurring practice that appears systematic.
The thing is, situations in which participants with the lowest price offers win the auction. Still, after the procedure is completed, they refuse in writing to enter into a contract on the terms specified in the request for proposals. As a result, customers are forced to conclude agreements with the next-ranked participants at higher prices.
Such cases were recorded in at least six December procurements:
- https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/tender/UA-2025-12-17-011367-a
The selected offer is UAH 551,628.24 more expensive - https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/tender/UA-2025-12-17-022160-a
The selected offer is UAH 28,250.78 more expensive - https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/tender/UA-2025-12-19-022931-a
The selected offer is UAH 39,782.73 more expensive - https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/tender/UA-2025-12-16-008255-a
The selected offer is UAH 527,247.72 more expensive - https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/tender/UA-2025-12-12-009459-a
The selected offer is UAH 68,187.6 more expensive - https://prozorro.gov.ua/uk/tender/UA-2025-12-17-009771-a
The selected offer is UAH 17,043.9 more expensive
In some procedures, the situation was even more revealing: with the participation of four companies, after the end of the bidding, three refused to conclude the contract, which actually left the customer with the offer at the highest price: UA-2025-12-16-008255-a
The total difference between the lowest offers and the actually concluded contracts in these procurements is UAH 1,232,140.97.
The mass of such refusals within one month and one region indicates a systemic practice that calls into question the proper level of competition in electricity procurement and the economic justification for spending budget funds.
For frontline communities operating in conditions of chronic resource shortages, such scenarios have particularly sensitive consequences.
Who exactly supplies electricity to budget institutions, how funds are concentrated in this segment, as well as what are the profiles of the winning companies — their ownership and management structure, the relationship of beneficiaries and managers, the number and amounts of won procurements in December 2025 — are described in detail in our analytical report, which will soon appear on our website and social networks.
This material has been produced with the support of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). Its contents do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of EED. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in this publication lies entirely with the author(s).
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