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On March 23, 2026, Volodymyr Puzyrev, manager of the Union Foundation, attended the forum “Key Challenges for Electoral Democracy After the Great War,” organized by the Civil Network OPORA in Kyiv. Representatives of parliament, the Central Election Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the National Agency for Corruption Prevention, diplomatic missions, and civil society discussed strategies for restoring democratic processes.
Participants discussed how to conduct the first post-war elections fairly, transparently, and safely, despite the destroyed infrastructure and population displacement. Special attention was given to preparing the legislative framework. This process must be proactive and begin now to prevent the “loss of the state” in the future.
Forum participants also focused on the situation in the de-occupied and frontline territories, particularly in the Kherson region. They discussed critical challenges related to the outdated data in the State Voter Registry due to constant population migration and the physical impossibility of conducting elections in completely destroyed settlements. According to available data, approximately 21% of the electoral infrastructure (about 6,000 polling stations) in Ukraine has been damaged, destroyed, or is under occupation.
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Oleksandr Kornienko, First Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, spoke about the catastrophic state of infrastructure in the south of the country and the search for alternative solutions: “We have frontline villages in the Kherson region where there isn’t a single intact building. There, to be honest, it’s hard to say where an election commission could be housed...”
In addition to destroyed buildings, a key threat is Russian disinformation and hybrid attacks aimed at destabilizing frontline communities. Experts also highlight the risks posed by unregulated platforms, particularly Telegram, as well as the use of artificial intelligence to create deepfakes that could distort the will of the people.
In particular, Gediminas Navickas, the EU Delegation to Ukraine's Deputy Ambassador, emphasized: “We will face massive hybrid activities and Russian interference, as was the case in Moldova and other countries... with our enemies’ key objective being to undermine the integrity of the elections and erode public trust.”
Oleksandr Burmahin, a member of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, added: “Coordinated external interference is a huge threat… we currently have no digital regulator in the country at the legislative level… The main attacks occur through bots, through coordinated actions by anonymous accounts, and so on.”
Ukrainian MP Viktoria Siumar emphasized: “We must transform the education system and teach society critical thinking. Without this, unfortunately, technology will develop faster than we do.”
A security audit of the territories should become the key tool for determining the feasibility of holding elections in frontline zones.
Ukrainian MP Alina Zagoruiko explained the logic behind this process: “This is not about assessing the entire territory of Ukraine. We are deliberately focusing only on the frontline areas, where there is a real danger. The bill provides for the possibility of deciding that voting is not possible at a specific polling station to minimize manipulation and allow as many citizens as possible to exercise their right.”
Roman Lozinsky, a member of parliament from the Holos faction and a former Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemember, emphasized that those who have stood as a wall for the country must be a state priority in all policies. He identified the creation of special polling stations for defenders who will remain on duty at the contact line on election day as the most challenging issue. According to Lozinsky, rejecting such polling stations would mean depriving soldiers of their right to vote: “If parliament rejects special polling stations, then military personnel will be left without the right to vote. In other words, you’re carrying out your duties, but you won’t be able to vote—yet we thank you for your service. That’s why I believe this aspect should be the most important.”
For frontline and de-occupied communities, one of the most pressing challenges is the risk that candidates who collaborated with the occupiers will be nominated. It is expected that during the local elections, a vast amount of information will emerge claiming that a particular candidate “collaborated with the Russians for the first three days.”
To address this issue, the following is proposed:
- Establishing an interagency group involving the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, and the Central Election Commission to verify candidates;
- Mechanisms of “soft lustration” - voters will be officially informed of a candidate’s collaboration with the enemy, even if there is no final court verdict;
- Protection against disinformation. Russia will attempt to disrupt elections in frontline communities by spreading false claims that voting at polling stations is dangerous or will lead to immediate mobilization, etc.
These measures are viewed as part of a “protective framework” designed to ensure the agency of Ukrainian society and prevent the loss of statehood due to internal divisions in the post-war period.
In conclusion, Olga Aivazovska, Chair of the Board of the Civil Network OPORA, noted that the success of the elections depends 50% on the law and infrastructure, and another 50% on the moral state of society: “We will be living in a time of great turbulence. And during this period, we will have to find what is essential - the truth - and, obviously, invest in the right things. If we do not find a solution now to anticipate these challenges, it is clear that we will lose - we will lose the state. And as I said in my opening remarks—we have only one of it, just as we have only one life.”
For the Union Foundation, it is important to remain engaged in the discussion and understanding of electoral processes. After all, the further development and recovery of communities - particularly those that have been de-occupied and those near the front lines - depend to a large extent on how transparently, securely, and inclusively these processes are organized.
